• 1896 March to June – Campaign against OvaMbanderu and Khauas Nama •
Leutwein’s policy of divide and rule
Governor Theodor Leutwein practised a sophisticated policy of divide and rule since his arrival in the ‘protectorate’ of German South West Africa at the turn of the year 1893/1894. It was successful because the OvaHerero, Nama and other peoples were organised in groups.
The chiefs (OtjiHerero: omuhona, pl. ovahona; Nama called/call their chiefs kaptein, pl. kapteins) of these groups concluded alliances and agreements with each other. However, the agreements could be cancelled at any time if one of the partners deemed it advantageous. Under these conditions, it was a must to be suspicious and on guard at all times.
The Schutztruppe was gradually strengthened under Leutwein. As a result, many ovahona and kaptains saw it as a strong partner for asserting their respective interests. Cattle, water points and grazing areas were at stake.
Leutwein offered them so-called protection contracts. In return, the chiefs accepted restrictions on their autonomy. Above all, this included defining the boundaries of the territories of individual groups and the Germans. Livestock grazing beyond the borders could simply be confiscated.
‘Protection treaties’ as a means of division
On the surface, Leutwein used the protection treaties to create peace – even among the individual groups that fight each other from time to time. But his real aim was to strengthen the influence of the Germans. Leutwein used the protection treaties to play the groups off against each other.
A brief flashback to the year 1890: Samuel Maharero in Okahandja found it difficult to assert himself as successor after the death of his father (Ka)Maharero. As a Christian and having attended the missionary school, he was part of the new ‘educated’ elite.
However, he had relatively little cattle, which was seen as a measure of power by the traditionally-minded majority of the OvaHerero. So he used the Germans to compensate for this power deficit. At their side, Samuel Maharero succeeded in becoming the wealthiest omuhona.
The Germans, in turn, helped him achieve the status of ‘Paramount Chief’ (Leutwein used the term ‘Oberhäuptling’ = head chief) of the OvaHerero in order to assert their interests with him as a partner. Also towards other Herero ovahona. Several ovahona did not recognise this status.
Conflict between Maharero and Kavikuna
At the beginning of 1896, Leutwein negotiated with Samuel Maharero and Mbanderu omuhona Nicodemus Kavikunua (areas near Gobabis) to resolve a conflict. He described this in his book “Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika”. The book was published in 1906, one year after Leutwein was ordered back to Germany.
Specifically, it was about preventing the ovahonas’ subordinates from grazing their cattle beyond their territories. German settlers’ farms were also affected. The negotiated settlement safeguarded the interests of the Germans and shifted the border between West and East Herero in favour of Maharero.
Kavikunua then apparently forged a coalition to resist the Germans. At the end of March 1896, the Khauas Nama under their kaptein Eduard Lambert attacked the fortress in Gobabis. Shortly afterwards, Kavikunua’s fighters attacked the Germans. Both attacks failed. Lambert fell.
With Maharero and Witbooi against Kavikuna
Allies in the war against OvaMbanderu and Khauas Nama: Witbooi-Oorlam (Nama) kaptein (chief) Hendrik Witbooi (l.), Governor of German South West Africa, Theodor Leutwein, and Herero omuhona (chief) Samuel Maharero after the battle at Otjunda (Sturmfeld) on 6 May 1896. Source: National Archives of Namibia
Omuhona Samuel Maharero and Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi also took part in the campaign of the German Schutztruppe. According to Leutwein, the troop consisted of “about 180 whites and Barstard soldiers [Rehoboth Baster; ed.], 70 Witboois and 120 Hereros” (“aus etwa 180 Weißen und Barstardsoldaten, 70 Witboois und 120 Hereros.”).
Witbooi had signed a protection treaty only two years earlier, in September 1894, after a hard fight against the Germans. He was held in high esteem among the Nama groups in southern Namibia.
Kavikunua and his subordinate omuhona Kahimemua Nguvauva surrendered and were executed. In Nguvauva’s case, according to Leutwein, this happened because Samuel Maharero insisted on it. He thus got rid of influential opponents.
Court martial in Okahandja
Theodor Leutwein described the proceedings of the court martial in Okahandja in his book (p. 116) [own translation; ed.]:
“The judicial enquiry into the causes and authors of the uprising was conducted by Assessor v. Lindequist. [Leutwein adds on p. 117: “Furthermore, two grandees appointed by the head chief were present as judges at the court martial.” – By ‘the head chief’ Leutwein means Samuel Maharero; ed.]
It revealed with unambiguous clarity that the instigator of the uprising had been Nicodemus alone, and that he had begun his rummaging immediately after his appointment as Captain of the East.
He had also tried to involve Witbooi by asking him the seemingly harmless question of how he, Witbooi, felt under German rule. Witbooi wisely did not enter into an exchange of letters, but rather gave a verbal, meaningless reply through messengers.
Nicodemus himself denied everything, even in the face of the confronting witnesses, including his co-accused Kahimema [Kahimemua; ed.]. The latter did not gloss over anything, but pointed out, not without justification, that we, i.e. the head chief and I, had placed him under Nicodemus and that he should therefore have followed him.
In view of this undoubtedly mitigating circumstance and because of his open confession, I would have liked to have Kahimema pardoned, but Samuel was firmly against it. As a result, the two leaders were shot on 12 June in execution of the sentence passed.”
Kriegsgericht in Okahandja
Original text by Leutwein:
“Die gerichtliche Untersuchung über die Ursachen und die Urheber des Aufstandes wurde durch Assessor v. Lindequist geführt. [Auf S. 117 fügt Leutwein hinzu: “Ferner waren auch beim Kriegsgericht zwei seitens des Oberhäuptlings bestellte Großleute als Richter anwesend.” Mit “Oberhäuptling” meint Leutwein Samuel Maharero; ed.]
Sie ergab mit unzweideutiger Klarheit, daß der Anstifter zum Aufstande einzig und allein Nikodemus gewesen war, und zwar hatte er seine Wühlereien unmittelbar nach seiner Einsetzung als Kapitän des Ostens begonnen.
Auch Witbooi hatte er hineinzuziehen versucht, indem er ihm die anscheinend harmlose Frage stellte, wie er, Witbooi, sich unter deutscher Herrschaft fühle. Witbooi ließ sich klugerweise auf einen Briefwechsel gar nicht ein, gab vielmehr durch Boten eine mündliche, nichtssagende Antwort.
Nikodemus selbst leugnete auch angesichts der gegenübergestellten Zeugen, einschließlich seines Mitschuldigen Kahimema, alles. Letzterer beschönigte nichts, wies aber nicht mit Unrecht darauf hin, daß wir, d.h. der Oberhäuptling und ich, ihn unter Nikodemus gestellt hätten, und daß er daher diesem hätte folgen müssen.
Angesichts dieses zweifellos mildernden Umstandes sowie wegen seines offenen Geständnisses würde ich Kahimema gern begnadigt haben, jedoch sprach sich Samuel entschieden dagegen aus. Infolgedessen wurden in Vollziehung des gefällten Urteils die beiden Führer am 12. Juni erschossen.”
The captured cattle were divided up between Maharero, Witbooi and the Germans. The Khauas Nama were sent to a prison camp in Windhoek. There they served as labourers. After the campaign, the Schutztruppe was further reinforced. At the end of 1897, it numbered 700 men instead of 500.
Sources:
- Leutwein, Theodor: Der Aufstand 1896 (The Uprising 1896), in: Leutwein 1906 (re-published as freely accessible e-book by The Project Gutenberg in 2019), p. 97 – 118
- DHPS History Department 2020
- Häussler, Matthias: Why OvaHerero accommodated the Germans? On the ‘pacification’ of an acephalous society: co-operation and violence, in: Hartmann 2019, p. 41 – 60
The Mbanderu ovahona (chiefs) Nicodemus Kavikuna (r.) and Kahimemua Nguvauva before their execution on 12 June 1896 in Okahandja. Source: National Archives of Namibia